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FLORIDA'S HOSPITAL LIEN LAWS
META CALDER*
URING both the 1992 and 1993 Florida legislative sessions, leg-
islators introduced several bills that proposed creating a general
hospital lien law., Hospitals liens are liens against the proceeds of
settlements or judgments awarded to persons that have received medi-
cal services for injuries resulting from the incidents giving rise to the
cause of action settled or adjudicated.2 The bills had two main pur-
poses. The first was to eliminate the uneven patchwork of hospital
liens created by special acts3 or local ordinances, and to create a uni-
form, statewide hospital lien statute. The second, and more contro-
versial, purpose was to address a claimed "deficiency" in the special
acts by providing for both attorneys' fees and patient disability com-
pensation.
Although few would consider the subject of hospital liens worth
more than a yawn, the issue pits Florida's hospitals against Florida's
trial lawyers and remains on the legislative agenda of the Academy of
Florida Trial Lawyers. 4 Under present law, thirteen of the eighteen
special acts plus two county ordinances make no provision for attor-
neys' fees, addressing only a hospital's right to attach any settlement
or judgment awarded to a claimant to cover all reasonable medical
services the hospital has provided to the claimant.5 Florida courts in-
* Staff Attorney, Committee on Health Care, Florida House of Representatives; B.A.,
1972, Florida Atlantic University; J.D., 1991, Florida State University College.of Law.
The author wishes to extend special thanks to Mike Hansen, Cindy Alison, and Janet
DeCosta.
1. Fla. HB 1297 (19_2); Fla. SB 1866 (1992); Fla. HB 1053 (1993); Fla. SB 976 (1993).
2. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
3. A "special act" or "local law" in Florida is a law passed by the Legislature that ap-
plies only to a particular person, or category of persons, or a particular place or district rather
than to the public generally, or a class of persons or things regardless of where they exist within
the state. With regard to hospital liens, a special act authorizing hospital liens will apply only to
one or more particular hospitals, or to all the hospitals in a particular hospital district or
county. See 10 FLA. JuR. 21 Constitutional Law § 329-38 (1979).
4. In anticipation of the 1994 session, the March 1993 issue of The Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers Journal includes a general call requesting information on problems that attor-
neys have experienced with hospital lien laws-in particular, situations where the attorney had
to turn down a case because of a hospital lien or because a hospital would have taken all or
most of the settlement or judgment. Jeffrey J. Sneed, Assignments of Medicare or Medicaid to
a Hospital, ACADEMY op FLA. TRIAL LAW. J., Mar. 1993, at 2, 11-12.
5. See infra notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
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terpret these laws as granting hospital liens priority over both attor-
ney liens and patient disability compensation .6 Hospitals argue that
unless they are assured priority in reimbursement, the cost of indigent
care to the state will increase. In response, the trial lawyers contend
that when neither the attorney or the plaintiff have any hope of com-
pensation, there is no motivation to bring suit. Consequently, both
the hospitals and the injured plaintiffs lose and potentially liable tort-
feasors and their insurance companies avoid payment.
Surprisingly little has been written about hospital liens both in
Florida and throughout the states.' This Article will review the his-
tory and present state of Florida's hospital lien law as well as briefly
summarize hospital lien law throughout the country. This review will
include an analysis of Florida's constitutional prohibition against
special acts or general laws of local application that relate to certain
types of liens, which may present a serious challenge to the constitu-
tionality of hospital liens created by special act. Finally, the Article
will discuss the present policy rationale for hospital liens and recom-
mend the adoption of a general law to impose uniformity, predicta-
bility, and fairness with respect to the equitable distribution of tort
claim proceeds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a lien is a charge, encumbrance, or security upon
real or personal property for the payment of some debt, obligation,
or duty.8 "It does not constitute a right of property in the thing itself,
but a right to levy on [the property] and sell it for satisfaction of the
debt." 9 A lien may be created by contract or by operation of law,
that is, common law or statute.10
A lien created by express contract includes an agreement that cer-
tain property will be held as security for the payment of a specified
6. See infra notes 139-42, 146-47 and accompanying text.
7. The author was unable to uncover a single article generally addressing the subject of
hospital liens other than a 1969 American Law Reports annotation, J.F. Rydstrom, Annota-
tion, Construction, Operation, and Effect of Statute Giving Hospital Lien Against Recovery
from Torifeasor Causing Patient's Injuries, 25 A.L.R. 3D 858 (1969), and a reference to a 1960
survey and bibliography on hospital liens in the UNivstsrrY OF PrrrSBURGH HEALTH LAW CEN-
TER, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, FN.IAI. MANAGEMENT (Attorney's Volume 1959-60).
All but nine states (Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming) presently have general laws providing hospital liens.
Only Florida uses the curious arrangement of authorizing hospital liens by special acts. See
infra notes 88-123 and accompanying text.
8. BLA K's LAW DICTONARY 922 (6th ed. 1990).
9. 34 FLA. JUR. ID Liens § 1 (1982).
10. Id. § 2.
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debt or other obligation, for example, a mortgage." Usually there is
some connection between the debt and the property subject to the
lien. In the absence of a lien created by express contract, a court may
nevertheless equitably infer a lien from the relationship of the parties
and the circumstances of their dealings. 2 A party is entitled to an
equitable lien, however, only when it has in good faith relied on
fraud or misrepresentation of essential facts. 3
Common law liens depended on actual and continued possession of
the property. Thus, the common law has recognized liens in favor of
innkeepers, common carriers, and warehousemen, as well as the vari-
ous artisans, tradesmen, mechanics, and laborers that receive prop-
erty for the purpose of repairing or improving the property.14
Liens created by statute require privity of contract between the lien
claimant and the party bound by the lien. 5 Nevertheless, there exists
no requirement that the contract expressly create the lien. The statute
simply creates the lien as an artifact of the contractual relationship.
The relationship between hospitals and their patients is always con-
tractual, whether express or implied. Although most hospital-patient
contracts are express and are completed prior to or upon patient ad-
mission, an implied or quasi contract results when persons are admit-
ted under emergency situations where there is no opportunity to
obtain prior consent. Under such circumstances, the common law im-
plies consent. 6
All hospital liens are statutory liens; there is no basis for such liens
at common law.'" Unlike most states, whose hospital liens exist by
virtue of general law, Florida hospital liens exist on a county-by-
county basis by virtue of special acts and local ordinances.
While a hospital lien secures payment for labor and services, it
does not attach to property in the usual sense. Instead, the lien at-
taches to all rights of action which the injured person may assert, as
11. Id. §8.
12. Id. § 9; Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925).
13. Id. § 10; Merrit v. Unkefer, 223 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1969).
14. 34 FLA. JUR. 2D Liens §§ 4-5 (1982). Many of these liens have been codified. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ch. 713, pt. 11 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
15. 34 FLA. JUR. 2D Liens § 13 (1982). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 713, pt. 1 (1991 & Supp.
1992) (granting "construction" liens on real property to architects, landscape architects, inte-
rior designers, engineers, land surveyors, materialmen, and laborers that have contracts to fur-
nish materials or perform services which improve property).
16. See, e.g., Nursing Care Servs., Inc. v. Dobos, 380 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see
generally 11 FLA. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 236-46 (1979).
17. J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction, Operation, and Effect of Statute Giving
Hospital Lien Against Recovery from Tortfeasor Causing Patient's Injuries, 25 A.L.R. 3D 858,
862 (1969).
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well as the proceeds of any settlements or judgments arising from the
causes of action that necessitated hospitalization and medical treat-
ment.' Therefore, the hospital need not bring suit against the patient
to recover payment for the care it has provided. The lienholder, how-
ever, cannot usually enforce the lien unless the patient brings a claim
or cause of action.
Hospital liens assure hospitals a source of payment for the medical
care they provide to nonpaying or indigent accident victims.' 9 Never-
theless, in recent years, with the advent of Medicare's prospective
payment system and its subsequent adoption by private insurance
programs,20 hospitals often prefer to seek payment through the impo-
sition of a lien even when the patient has adequate health insurance. 21
Hospitals favor this procedure because automobile and liability insur-
ance reimburse hospitals at a higher rate than health insurance. Such
reimbursement is based on the hospital's actual charges rather than
on a fee schedule tied to the patient's diagnosis. 22
Because Florida case law has given priority to hospital liens over all
other liens or claims, attorneys are reluctant to take cases where the
potential recovery would not be sufficient to meet other patient needs
18. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
19. Id.; see also Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218
So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969):
No lien is necessary against the injured patient as the usual channels of legal recourse
are available against a solvent patient indebted to the hospital for services. The prob-
lem to which the Legislature addressed itself arises for the hospital when it is con-
fronted with an insolvent patient whose treatment results in a mounting bill for
expenses.
Id. at 798.
20. Under the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRG) method of payment, Medicare takes all
medical diagnoses, groups them according to their relative medical resource consumption, and
assigns an average cost per grouping. Medicare then determines the amount it will reimburse
hospitals prospectively according to the patient's diagnosis, rather than retrospectively accord-
ing to the hospital's cost per patient. The DRG system attempts to reward hospitals for operat-
ing more efficiently. Many private health insurance companies have adopted this payment
system. MARK A. HALL & IKA MARK ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETmCS IN A NUTSHELL 24-
33 (1990). See FLA. STAT. § 627.6044 (Supp. 1992) (permitting health insurance policies to pay
according to a formula or criteria).
21. Federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2) (1988), mandates that Medicare be a secondary
payor if payment can be made under an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan or
under no-fault insurance. Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1988), requires states to take all
reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties to pay for care or services
available under Medicaid and, where legal liability is found, to seek reimbursement for such
assistance. Thus, under Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. §
409.910(1)(c) (Supp. 1992), the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services has an auto-
matic lien for the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid for medical care
required as a result of any covered injury or illness for which a third party is or may be liable.
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAr. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992) (requiring all automobile personal in-
jury protection policies to pay 80% of all reasonable expenses for necessary medical services).
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or expenses, including attorneys' fees. Unless the attorney works out
an arrangement with the hospital before pursuing a claim, there is no
incentive to take a patient's case. This allows the tortfeasor's insur-
ance company to avoid payment even when their insured is clearly
liable. Furthermore, even if attorneys' fees are provided, little moti-
vation exists to pursue a claim if the claimant will not receive some
portion of the recovery, particularly if the plaintiff is indigent. Often
the injured party is also liable for costs in addition to hospital medi-
cal expenses, such as physician fees, nursing fees, or therapeutic care
costs, not to mention compensation for lost income.
II. LIEmN LAWS
A. Florida's 1951 Population Act
In 1951, the Florida Legislature passed a general law of local
application23 granting all hospitals in counties with populations over
325,000 the right to impose liens.24 At the time, only Dade County
qualified, with a population of 425,000 according to the official 1950
U.S. census. 2
The Act, which has served as the model for most of the subsequent
special acts granting hospital liens on a county by county basis, pro-
vided:
Every individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation,
institution, and governmental unit, and every combination of any of
the foregoing, operating a hospital. . . shall be entitled to a lien for
all reasonable charges for hospital care, treatment and maintenance
of ill or injured persons upon any and all causes of action, suits,
claims, counterclaims and demands accruing to the persons to
whom such care, treatment or maintenance are furnished, . . . and
upon all judgements, settlements and settlement agreements
rendered or entered into by virtue thereof, on account of illness or
23. Laws of this nature are referred to as "population acts" because their applicability is
based on each county's population.
24. Ch. 27032, 1951 Fla. Laws 1316. A "general law of local application" differs from a
"special law" in that it operates uniformly throughout the state upon a specified classification
(usually population) wherever it exists in the state, rather than being limited to a particular
person, group, or locality. 10 FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 329 (1979). Nevertheless, the
classification scheme is such that the law's application is restricted to particular localities. Id. §
336. A general law of local application is often vulnerable to constitutional challenge as being a
special act in disguise. See generally id. §§ 327-38.
25. FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1967 26 (Alvin B. Biscoeet al. eds., 1967).
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injuries . . . which necessitated or shall have necessitated such
hospital care, treatment and maintenance.2 6
According to the Act, to perfect the lien, the hospital must file a
verified claim with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where
the hospital is located before the patient is discharged or within ten
days thereafter. 27 The claim must include the names of the patient,
the hospital and its agent, the dates of admission and discharge, the
amount due, and the names and addresses of all persons the injured
person claims are liable for his injuries.2 8 In addition, the hospital
must mail a copy of the claim to all persons listed as liable within one
day of filing the claim. 29
The Act further stipulated that no release or satisfaction of any
claim by the patient is valid unless the lienholder (the hospital) joined
in it or executed a release of such lien. 30 Further, in the absence of
participation by the lienholder, any acceptance of a release or satis-
faction between the patient and those claimed to be liable "shall
prima facie constitute an impairment of such lien, and the lienholder
shall be entitled to" damages, including attorneys' fees, from either
the party accepting or the party making the settlement." The Act
specified no time period following settlement within which the hospi-
tal must bring suit or lose its right of action.
The Act allowed a lienholder to intervene in any action brought by
the patient and recover the reasonable cost of such hospital care.32
Additionally, the jury was required to set forth the amount it found
the lienholder was due in any verdict rendered in favor of the pa-
tient.33 That amount must also be stated in the judgment.34 The Act
also exempted any claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 35
The subsequent 1960 census would have added Broward (pop.
333,900), Duval (pop. 455,500), Hillsborough (pop. 397,900), and Pi-
nellas (pop. 374,700) counties to the list of those covered by the
Act. 36 Several 1961 acts, however, eliminated Broward, Hillsborough,
26. Ch. 27032, § 1, 1951 Fla. Laws 1316, 1317.
27. Id. § 2, 1951 Fla. Laws at 1317.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 4, 1951 Fla. Laws at 1318.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 5, 1951 Fla. Laws at 1318.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 6, 1951 Fla. Laws at 1319.
36. FLORIDA STATISTicAL ABSTRACT 1967 22-23 (Alvin B. Biscoe et al. eds., 1967). By 1960,
Dade's population had grown to 935, 100. Id.
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and Pinellas counties. Chapter 61-57717 amended the 1951 Act to ex-
clude those counties with populations between 350,000 and 385,000,
thus excluding Pinellas County for the remainder of the decade. Two
additional special acts, chapters 61-58811 and 61-1468,1 9 specifically
excluded Broward 4" and Hillsborough 4' counties from the reach of the
1951 Act regardless of future population growth. Thus, the Act only
applied to Duval and Dade Counties. In 1965, counties with popula-
tions between 390,000 and 450,000 according to the "latest statewide
decennial census" were also excluded from the Act. 41
By 1971, the year the 1951 Hospital Lien Act was repealed, the Act
applied only to counties with populations between 325,000 and
350,000, between 385,000 and 390,000, and over 425,000. 41 Accord-
ing to the 1970 census, this would have included Dade (pop.
1,267,792), Duval (pop. 528,865), Orange (pop. 344,311), and Palm
Beach (pop. 348,993) counties. 44 According to the stated purpose of
the 1971 Act, 4 which repealed many other population acts, the Legis-
lature intended to reduce dependence on general laws of local appli-
cation that were often subject to constitutional challenge and, at the
same time, to expand the home rule powers of local government.4
In keeping with the latter goal, the Act further declared that certain
previous acts, including the 1951 Hospital Lien Act, were to become
ordinances in the counties in which they applied on the effective date
of the 1971 Act. 47 Such ordinances could be subject to modification
and repeal in the manner of other ordinances. 48 Both Dade and Duval
counties subsequently codified the hospital lien law by ordinance.
With the exception of the order of the sections, the Dade County or-
dinance is substantively identical to the 1951 Act.49 The Duval ordi-
nance, which was modified in the early 1980s, differs from the 1951
37. 1961 Fla. Laws 66.
38. 1961 Fla. Laws 22.
39. 1961 Fla. Laws 1011.
40. By 1955, Broward already had its own Hospital Lien Act and thus had no need for the
1951 Act. See infra note 53.
41. Hillsborough County obtained its own Hospital Lien Act in 1980. See infra note 77.
42. Ch. 65-862, 1965 Fla. Laws 371. It is unclear why these counties were excluded be-
cause no additional counties fell into this bracket according to the 1960 census.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 37, and 42.
44. 1970 Official Florida State and Federal Census, 1973 Fla. Laws 801.
45. Ch. 71-29, § 1, 1971 Fla. Laws 96.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 3, 1971 Fla. Laws at 116.
48. Id.
49. DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 25C (1993).
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Act.50 By 1957, both Orange and Palm Beach counties had succeeded
in acquiring their own special acts, thus precluding any necessity to
adopt the 1951 Act by ordinance."'
B. Florida's Special Acts
Between 1951 and 1971, Volusia5 2 Broward," Escambia, 4 Mar-
ion,55 Seminole,5" Jackson,17 Orange,18 Palm Beach,5 9 Indian River,60
Bradford,61 and Sarasota 62 counties successfully sought special acts
authorizing hospital liens. Generally speaking, the Legislature based
these hospital lien acts upon the 1951 Hospital Lien Act and essen-
tially mirrored its provisions. 63 Some significant variations, however,
do exist. For example, the Palm Beach" and Indian River 6 county
acts apply only to public hospitals. The Orange County hospital lien
belongs to any Orange County hospital as well as to "any govern-
mental agency paying for hospital charges or medical treatment of
individuals in Orange County.' '
Three of the acts permit attorneys' fees. In Volusia County, the
patient's attorney may "be paid a reasonable fee of not less than
twenty-five per cent [sic] (25%) of the lien claimed by the lienor upon
collection or satisfaction of said lien." ' 67 The Orange County Act lim-
its the hospital lien to the lesser of "reasonable charges for care and
50. DuvAI COUNTY, FLA., HEALTH CODE ch. 482 (1993).
Several other counties also have hospital lien ordinances, but these seem to be merely restate-
ments of their special acts. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 16 (1993); OANGE
COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. rv (1993).
51. See infra notes 58-59. At the time Palm Beach County obtained its special act, which
applied only to public hospitals, it did not qualify under the 1951 Act. By the time the 1951 Act
was repealed in 1971, Palm Beach County had, and theoretically still has, the potential to qual-
ify under the 1971 Act and thus could adopt an ordinance that includes all the other hospitals.
52. Ch. 29591, 1953 Fla. Laws 3184.
53. Ch. 30615, 1955 Fla. Laws 307.
54. Ch. 30733, 1955 Fla. Laws 964.
55. Ch. 30965, 1955 Fla. Laws 2241.
56. Ch. 31274, 1955 Fla. Laws 3355.
57. Ch. 57-1420, 1957 Fla. Laws 1797.
58. Ch. 57-1644, 1957 Fla. Laws 2689.
59. Ch. 57-1688, 1957 Fla. Laws 2827. During the 1993 legislative session, the Palm Beach
Health Care District also obtained a lien. See infra notes 80, 88-92 and accompanying text.
60. Ch. 59-1384, 1959 Fla. Laws 1715.
61. Ch. 61-1897, 1961 Fla. Laws 455.
62. Ch. 61-2868, 1961 Fla. Laws 4418. This was amended in 1986. See infra notes 71-72
and accompanying text.
63. But see Sarasota's act, Ch. 61-2868, 1961 Fla. Laws 4118.
64. Ch. 57-1688, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 2827, 2827.
65. Ch. 59-1384, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 1715, 1716.
66. Ch. 57-1644, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 2689, 2690.
67. Ch. 29591, § 4, 1953 Fla. Laws 3184, 3187.
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treatment or the net amount of settlement or judgment after deduct-
ing costs of procuring the settlement or judgment." 68
Sarasota County's lien act requires court costs to be paid first, fol-
lowed by the plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 69 Pursuant to that act, after
payment of court costs and attorneys' fees, the hospital lien and the
plaintiff were to be on equal footing such that, if the proceeds of the
settlement or judgment were insufficient to fully pay the hospital,
then such proceeds were to "be prorated on a parity between the hos-
pital and the plaintiff or counter-claimant.', In 1986, the Legislature
gave hospitals in Sarasota priority over plaintiffs. 7' The 1986 amend-
ment to this act is also distinctive in that it broadly defines "hospital
care" to include both hospital and non-hospital health care services
provided by health care facilities owned or operated by the hospital
board or its subsidiaries, affiliates, or not-for-profit corporations . 2
The Sarasota hospital lien also extends to "the amounts due or paya-
ble under hospitalization insurance, . . . [or] under public liability
policies or other indemnity . . . . 7 Both the Sarasota and Indian
River acts require the hospital to perfect the lien within thirty days of
the patient's discharge, rather than the usual ten days. 74
Following the 1971 repeal of the 1951 Act, five other counties,
Monroe, 7 Lee, 76 Hillsborough,7 7 Alachua, 78 and Lake, 79 also obtained
lien laws. Additionally, the Palm Beach Health Care District recently
obtained its own lien provision. 0 The original Lee County act only
applied to Lee Memorial Hospital;' but, in 1989, a separate special
68. Ch. 57-1644, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 2689, 2690.
69. Ch. 61-2868, §§ 4-5, 1961 Fla. Laws 4418, 4421-22.
70. Id. § 4, 1961 Fla. Laws at 4421.
71. Ch. 86-373, § 5, 1986 Fla. Laws 100, 105.
72. Id.
73. Id.; Ch. 61-2868, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 4418, 4419.
74. Ch. 61-2868, § 2, 1961 Fla. Laws 4418; ch. 59-1384, § 2, 1959 Fla. Laws 1715.
75. Ch. 73-555, 1973 Fla. Laws 416. The Monroe County act only applies to the Lower
Florida Keys Hospital District.
76. Ch. 78-552, 1978 Fla. Laws 185.
77. Ch. 80-510, 1980 Fla. Laws 145.
78. Ch. 88-539, 1988 Fla. Laws 284.
79. Ch. 93-346, 1993 Fla. Laws 41.
80. Ch. 93-382, 1993 Fla. Laws 177. Recall that Palm Beach County public hospitals have
had their own lien since 1957. See supra note 59.
In 1987, Palm Beach County created a county-wide health care district, ch. 87-450, 1987 Fla.
Laws 68, under which the health care district is responsible for paying the health care costs of
all persons who are at 12501o of the federal poverty level and are not eligible for Medicare or
Medicaid. Because Palm Beach County public hospitals are now reimbursed (at a discounted
rate) by the health care district for all persons defined as indigent, they are no longer as in-
clined to use their lien privilege to seek reimbursement for the medical costs of such patients.
81. Ch. 78-552, § t, 1978 Fla. Laws 185, 185.
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act granted hospital lien powers to all non-profit organizations oper-
ating charitable hospitals in Lee County.12 As does the Sarasota act,
the county-wide Lee County act also extends to hospitalization insur-
ance and public liability policies. 3 Like the Sarasota and Indian River
acts, the 1989 Lee County act contains a three-day notice allowance
as well as a thirty-day, rather than a ten-day, perfection schedule.84
The Alachua act similarly applies only to non-profit corporations op-
erating charitable hospitals. 5
The Hillsborough lien law is distinctive in that it is merely one par-
agraph of a larger act that establishes the Hillsborough County Hos-
pital Authority. 6 Section seventeen simply entitles the Hospital
Authority to a lien for all reasonable hospital care upon any causes of
action accruing to persons for whom such treatment has been fur-
nished .87
The 1993 Lake County act 8 and Palm Beach Health Care District
Act89 are significant because they represent victories for both attor-
neys and plaintiffs. For example, a Lake County hospital lien is
limited to the lesser of the following: reasonable charges for care
and treatment, minus a pro-rata share of the reasonable cost of
procuring the settlement or judgment, or two-thirds of the net
amount of settlement or judgment after deducting the reasonable
cost of procuring the settlement or judgment. Reasonable costs of
procuring the settlement or judgment include reasonable attorney's
fees.90
In addition, the Lake County act gives the hospital 180 days to file a
claim with the circuit court.9
82. Ch. 89-540, § 1, 1989 Fla. Laws 414, 414.
83. Id. at 415.
84. Id. § 2, 1989 Fla. Laws at 415.
85. Ch. 88-539, § 1, 1988 Fla. Laws 284, 284.
86. Ch. 80-509, § 17, 1980 Fla. Laws 145, 149.
87. Id.
The authority shall be entitled to a lien for all reasonable charges for hospital care
and treatment of ill or injured persons upon any and all causes of action, suits,
claims, counterclaims and demands accruing to the persons or legal representatives
of the persons to whom such care or treatment are furnished and upon all judgments,
settlements and settlement agreements entered by virtue of such illness or injury.
Id.
88. Ch. 93-346, 1993 Fla. Laws 41.
89. Ch. 93-382, 1993 Fla. Laws 177.
90. Ch. 93-346, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 41, 42.
91. Id. § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 42.
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Similarly, the Palm Beach Health Care District's arrangement pro-
vides:
The amount of the lien created by this section shall be the entire
amount paid by the district ... less the district's pro rata share of
reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation for the
claimant's attorney; provided, however, that the amount of the lien
created by this section shall in no event be greater than two-thirds of
the amount remaining from the proceeds of the judgment,
settlement or settlement agreement after the deduction of attorney's
fees and other reasonable costs and expenses of litigation.92
Both the Lake County and Palm Beach Health Care District arrange-
ments not only give priority to attorneys' fees, but guarantee that at
least one-third of the recovery will go to the plaintiff.
C. Other States
At present, forty-one states and the District of Columbia have gen-
eral laws authorizing liens for medical care provided for injuries re-
sulting from an accident or wrongful act. 93 Almost half of these
92. Ch. 93-382, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 177, 178 (adding section 18 to ch. 87-450, 1987 Fla.
Laws 68, as amended by ch. 88-460, 1988 Fla. Laws 50; ch. 91-343, 1991 Fla. Laws 35; and ch.
92-340, 1992 Fla. Laws 128). Palm Beach County is now in the curious situation of having a
hospital lien law that does not provide for attorneys' fees and a Health Care District lien law
that does so provide.
93. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 35-11-370 to -375 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Alaska: ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.35.450-.480 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Arizona: ARrz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-931 to -936
(1990 & Supp. 1992); Arkansas: Aa. CODE ANN. §§ 18-46-101 to -117 (Michie 1987 & Supp.
1991); California: CA.. CIV. CODE §§ 3045.1-.6 (West 1974 & Supp. 1993); Colorado: CoLo.
REV. STAT. §§ 38-27-101 to -106 (1973 & Supp. 1992); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-73
(1978 & Supp. 1993); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 4301-06 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-470 to -477 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1992); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. §
507-4 (1985 & Supp. 1992); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 45-701 to -705 (1977 & Supp. 1992); Illinois:
rLL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, para. 96.9-101 (1991); Indiana: IND. CODs §§ 32-8-26-1 to -2 (1980 &
Supp. 1992); Iowa: IOWA CODE §§ 582.1-.4 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
65-406 to -409 (1992); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4751-:4755 (West 1991 & Supp.
1993); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3411-3415 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); Mary-
land: MD. Cos. LAW I CODE ANN. §§ 16-601 to -605 (1980 & Supp. 1992); Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 111, §§ 70A to 70D (1983 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. §§ 514.68-.73
(1990 & Supp. 1993); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 430.230-.250 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Mon-
tana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-1111 to -1118 (1991); Nebraska: NEir. REV. STAT. § 52-401
(1988 & Supp. 1992); Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 108.590-.668 (1991); New Hampshire: N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 448-A:I to -A:4 (1991 & Supp. 1992); New Jersey: N.J. REV. STAT. 4§
2A:44-35 to -46 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-8-1 to -7
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1992); New York: N.Y. LIEN LAW § 189 (McKinney 1991); North Caro-
lina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-49 to -51 (1991 & Supp. 1992); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 35-18-01 to 38-18-11 (1987 & Supp. 1991); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, §§ 43 to 44 (1990
& Supp. 1992); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. §§ 87.555-585 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Rhode Island!
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statutes were enacted during the Depression; six were enacted in
193994 and the remainder date from 1953 to 1979. 91 These statutes are
fairly similar. Usually, the lien applies to any person, individual,
partnership, firm, association, corporation, institution, or govern-
mental unit maintaining and operating a hospital in the state.,, Some
statutes, however, also apply to other health care services (e.g., am-
bulance services), 97 providers (e.g., physicians, nurses, dentists, physi-
cal or occupational therapists, chiropractors, podiatrists,
optometrists, psychologists), 9 and facilities (e.g., nursing homes,"
health maintenance organizations and dental corporations, °0 home
health agencies '0 ) as well as to hospitals. 102 On the other hand, seven
states take the more traditional approach (reimbursement for unpaid
medical care) and limit the lien to non-profit, charitable, or publicly
owned and operated hospitals. 10
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-3-4 to -8 (1985 & Supp. 1992); South Dakota: S.D. CODI iED LAWS ANN.
§§ 44-12-1 to -9 (1983 & Supp. 1992); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-22-101 to -107
(1980); Texas: TEx. PROP. CODE. ANN. §§ 55.001-.008 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 38-7-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2251 to
2256 (1982 & Supp. 1992); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-66.2 to .11 (Michie 1992); Wash-
ington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 60.44.010 to .060 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. §
779.80 (1981 & Supp. 1992); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-301 to -305 (1990 &
Supp. 1992).
94. Arkansas (1933), Connecticut (1941), Delaware (1935), Hawaii (1939), Idaho (1941),
Illinois (1939), Indiana (1933), Iowa (1939), Kansas (1939), Minnesota (1933), Missouri (1941),
New Jersey (1930), New York (1936), North Carolina (1935), North Dakota (1935), Oregon
(1931), Rhode Island (1939), Texas (1933), Washington (1937), and District of Columbia
(1939).
Nebraska has the earliest and shortest hospital lien law (1927).
95. Alabama (1955), Alaska (1959), Arizona (1954), California (1961), Colorado (1963),
Georgia (1953), Louisiana (1970), Maine (1967), Maryland (1957), Massachusetts (1959), Mon-
tana (1979), Nevada (1955), New Hampshire (1955), New Mexico (1953), Oklahoma (1969),
South Dakota (1964), Tennessee (1970), Utah (1965), Vermont (1963), Virginia (1950), Wiscon-
sin (1961).
96. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and District of Columbia.
97. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Arizona, Connecticut, Louisiana,
and Washington.
98. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Ha-
waii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington.
99. See the Georgia and New Jersey statutes cited supra note 93.
100. See the Massachusetts statute cited supra note 93.
101. See the New Hampshire statute cited supra note 93.
102. Sonic states have separate statutes granting liens for ambulance, physician, and similar
services. See, e.g., the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Idaho, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.
103. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin.
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Although the lien usually attaches to any settlement, judgment, or
compromise resulting from a cause of action, 1' 4 it may also attach to
the claim itself,1os or, as with Florida liens, both.' °6 Some statutes,
however, are more restrictive. For example, a Connecticut lien at-
taches only to the proceeds of an accident or liability insurance pol-
icy. 107 The lien laws of Alaska,108 Montana,' °9 North Dakota,"0 and
Oregon"' only apply to the patients' accident, liability, and health
insurance." 2 Finally, almost all the statutes specifically exempt work-
ers' compensation claims.
Significantly, over seventy-five percent of the lien statutes address
attorneys' fees and court expenses. Thirty states expressly provide ei-
ther that the hospital lien shall not have priority over or is subject to
an attorney's lien or contract, or that the hospital lien attaches only
after attorneys' fees and court costs have been paid.' 13
104. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alaska, California, Colorado, Ha-
waii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Ver-
mont, Washington, and District of Columbia.
105. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, and Virginia.
106. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-73 (1978 & Supp. 1993).
108. ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.450 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-11f4 (1991).
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-18-01 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
Ill. OR. REV. STAT. § 87.555 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
112. But see ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 33-931 (1990 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 3411 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); TEx. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 55.003 (West 1984 & Supp.
1993). These hospital lien laws expressly state that the lien does not apply to the patient's health
insurance.
113. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 35-11-370 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §
34.35.475 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Arizona: ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-934 (1990 & Supp. 1992);
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-46-103 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); Colorado: CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 38-27-101 (1973 & Supp. 1992); aeorgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-470 (Michie 1982 &
Supp. 1992); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, para. 96.9-101 (1991); Indiana: IND. CODE § 32-8-
26-2 (1980 & Supp. 1992); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 582.1 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-406 (1992); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4752 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993);
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3411 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); Maryland: MD. COM.
LAW I CODE ANN. §§ 16-601 to -605 (1980 & Supp. 1992); Massaehnsetts: MAS9 GEN. LAWS §
70A (1983 & Supp. 1993); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 514.68 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Missouri:
Mo. REV. STAT. § 430.250 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1114
(1991); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 108.600 and 108.650 (1991); New Mexico: N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-8-1 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1992); New York: N.Y. LIEN LAW § 189 (McKinney 1991),
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-50 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit.
42, § 43 (1990 & Supp. 1992); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 87.560 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Rhode
Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-3-4 (1985 & Supp. 1992); South Dakota: S.D. CODWiED LAWS ANN.
§ 44-12-2 (1983 & Supp. 1992); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-22-101 (1980); Utah: UTAH
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Two other states limit the proceeds of any recovery to expressly
allow for attorneys' fees and at least some direct patient recovery.
For example, California limits the lien to fifty percent of any final
judgment, compromise or settlement exceeding $100 after payment of
any prior liens." 4 Washington limits the lien to twenty-five percent of
the award."'
Seven states give priority to attorneys' expenses and limit the lien
to insure some patient recovery. For example, Illinois '6 and
Tennessee"17 expressly state that the hospital lien shall not affect the
priority of an attorney's lien and limit the hospital lien to one-third
of the patient's recovery. In Indiana, the hospital lien is inferior to all
claims for attorneys' fees, court costs, and the like, and the lien is
limited to assure the patient at least twenty percent of any settlement
or judgment." 8 Maryland," 9 Missouri, 2 0 and North Carolina 2' ex-
pressly state that a hospital lien is subordinate to an attorney's lien
and limit the lien to fifty percent of the patient's recovery. Vermont
states that its hospital liens shall not attach to one-third of the recov-
ery or $500, whichever is less, and shall be subordinate to an attor-
ney's lien. 12 2 Finally, Alabama, 123 Arizona, 24 and Virginia 25 give the
court discretion over the distribution of judgment proceeds among
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, and the lienholder.
All of the lien statutes impose notice requirements on the lien-
holder. Such requirements are fulfilled either by filing with the ap-
CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2251 (1982 &
Supp. 1992); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-66.3 (Michie 1992); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. §
779.80(5) (1981 & Supp. 1992). "
In addition, Hawaii's hospital lien is "subject to any common law liens." HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 507-4 (1985 & Supp. 1992). New Hampshire's hospital lien is subject to "any prior
liens." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 448-X:3 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
114. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3045.4 (West 1974 & Supp. 1993).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.44.010 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
116. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, para. 97, 101 (1991)
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-22-101.
118. IND. CODE §§ 32-8-26-2 to -3 (1980 & Supp. 1992). The Indiana statute is also distinc-
tive in that it requires that the hospital lien "be reduced 6iy the amount of any medical insur-
ance proceeds paid to the hospital on behalf of the patient after the hospital has made all
reasonable efforts to pursue the insurance claims in cooperation with the patient." Id. § 32-8-
26-3. In other words, the hospital must first seek payment through the patient's medical insur-
ance.
119. MD. CoM. LAW I CODE ANN. § 16-601 (1980 & Supp. 1992).
120. Mo. REV. STAT. § 430.250 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-50 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
122. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2251 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
123. ALA. CODE § 35-11-373 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
124. ARiz. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-934 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
125. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-66.9 (Michie 1992).
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propriate county clerk, 26 or by directly mailing a notice to the injured
person, his or her attorney, and all potentially liable parties and their
insurers. 27 The statutes usually require both forms of notice.'28 Most
jurisdictions require that notice be filed in the county or district
where the hospital is located. 129 A significant number, however, re-
quire that notice be filed in the area where the injury occurred. 30 Al-
most all of the statutes hold the tortfeasor or his insurer liable for
payment to the lienholder, even if they have already settled with the
injured party, if they received notice prior to payment. Usually, a
time limitation is also placed on the payor's continued liability.
III. FLORIDA CASE LAW
Some courts have characterized Florida's hospital lien law as well
established by a long line of precedent upholding hospital liens.' 3'
Stated more accurately, however, there exists a long line of precedent
upholding Dade County's lien law. This lien law was originally en-
acted as the 1951 General Act of Local Application and subsequently
transformed into Dade County's hospital lien ordinance. This section
summarizes the line of cases interpreting Dade County's hospital lien
law and examines the two non-Dade County cases that involve special
acts granting hospital liens.
A. The Dade County Cases
The first appellate decision considering the 1951 Act, Palm Springs
General Hospital, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,132 considered two issues: first, when does a hospital lien attach;
and second, whether the 1951 Act is, in reality, a special act and,
126. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Hawaii, North Carolina, Texas,
and Washington.
127. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: California, Connecticut, Louis-
iana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, and Vermont.
128. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Min-
nesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, Washington, and District
of Columbia.
129. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
130. See the following state statutes cited supra note 93: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Dela-
ware, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin.
131. Fernandez v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
("The validity and priority of a hospital lien have been firmly established."); see also Hospital
Bd. of Directors v. McCray, 456 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
132. 218 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), aff'd, 232 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).
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therefore, unconstitutional because it did not meet the notice and ref-
erendum requirements required of a special act.
In Palm Springs, the Third District Court of Appeal concluded
that a hospital lien attaches when the injured person is admitted as a
patient, and is perfected when notice of the lien is filed with the clerk
of the circuit court.'33 The court rejected the argument that the 1951
Hospital Lien Act was a special act and found a reasonable relation-
ship between the Act's purposes and its classification by popula-
tion. 3 4 "In the highly populated counties, the hospitals are far more
wont to be administering care to the indigent accident victim and thus
in greater need of a lien-type means of assuring payment from such
persons."' 35 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
holding. 136
Notably, neither the Third District nor the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the 1951 Hospital Lien Act offended
the then newly-enacted provision of the 1968 Florida Constitution
which prohibited special laws or general laws of local application per-
taining to the "creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of
liens based on private contracts, or fixing of interest rates on private
contracts."'13 7 Nevertheless, subsequent decisions have held special
acts providing for hospital liens are ipso facto constitutional without
regard to the grounds for the constitutional challenge because the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1951 Act
as a legitimate population act. 3 '
133. d. at 798; see also Public Health Trust v. Carroll, 509 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1987) (also holding Dade County's hospital lien valid despite late filing: "tardy filing
does not invalidate the hospital lien, but only results in the lienor or creditor being an unse-
cured creditor, at least until such time as the lien is filed").
134. 218 So. 2d at 799. Article III, section 11, paragraph (b) of the Florida Constitution,
permits general laws of local application, affecting only certain categories of persons, political
subdivisions, or other governmental entities, provided the classification is "reasonably related
to the subject of the law." See supra note 24.
The court is apparently unaware that, by 1969, eleven other counties had hospital liens by
special act, including counties such as Bradford County with a population of only 12,400 ac-
cording to the 1960 census. FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1967 at 22-23 (Alvin B. Biscoe et
al., eds.). Other counties with lien laws and low populations at the time of this decision in-
clude: Marion, 51,600; Seminole, 54,900; Jackson, 36,200; Indian River, 25,200; and Sarasota,
76,900. Id.
135. 218 So. 2d at 799.
136. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., Inc., 232 So. 2d 737
(Fla. 1970).
137. FLA. CO NST. art. III, § 1 l(a)(9). There is no comparable provision in the 1885 Consti-
tution. See Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Commentary to Art. III, § 11, Vol. 25A FLA. STAT.
ANN. 619, 621 (West 1991) ("Apparently, the only section in the 1885 Constitution to which
the present paragraph (9) can be related is Declaration of Rights, Section 17, which prohibited
laws impairing obligation of contracts.").
138. Hospital Bd. of Directors v. McCray, 456 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) ("A
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In Dade County v. Bodie39 and Dade County v. Perez,140 the Third
District also considered issues concerning the 1951 Act. Both Bodie
and Perez rejected the argument that a court may reduce the amount
a hospital may receive when the correctness of the amount of the hos-
pital's charges is not challenged.' 41 The Third District based its deci-
sions on the fact that the 1951 Act stated that the amount of the lien
shall be for the hospital's reasonable charges and contained no provi-
sion suggesting that the hospital's lien should be for anything less
than the full amount. 142 Although not stated, one could reasonably
assume that the trial court had made some adjustments for attorneys'
fees and patient compensation.
Following the 1971 repeal of the 1951 Act, the Third District con-
tinued to uphold the provisions of the 1951 Act, now a Dade County
ordinance. In Dade County v. Pavon, 43 the Third District nullified a
settlement between the widow of a patient and the patient's uninsured
motorist insurance carrier which ignored the hospital's properly no-
ticed lien claim. The court based its decision on the lien ordinance,
which provided that no release or satisfaction of any claim would be
valid unless the lienholder was part of the settlement or had executed
a release of the lien. 1" The court also rejected the argument that the
hospital lien did not attach to benefits paid under an uninsured mo-
torist policy. 45
In Public Health Trust v. O'Neal,146 the Third District refused to
reduce the amount of a hospital's lien to provide for the patient's
attorney's fees. It found that the Dade County ordinance did not pro-
similar hospital lien act withstood a constitutional attack and was approved by the supreme
court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc.,
232 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).").
139. 237 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
140. 237 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
141. 237 So. 2d at 554; 237 So. 2d at 783.
In Bodie, the hospital's charges were $4,362.05, and the amount available was $5,000. The
trial court reduced the amount paid to the hospital to $1000. 237 So. 2d at 553-54.
In Perez, the settlement was for $1,780, and the hospital's charges amounted to $1,931.95.
The trial court reduced the hospital's portion to $200. 237 So. 2d at 782.
142. Bodie, 237 So. 2d at 554; Perez, 237 So. 2d at 783.
143. 266 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
144. Id. at 96-97; see also HCA Health Servs., Inc. v. Ratican, 475 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1985) (holding lower court's approval of a settlement between the injured party and the
patient and invalidation of the hospital lien not binding since the hospital was not a party to
the suit).
Along similar lines, the Third District held that the hospital lien was extinguished when the
patient and the hospital amicably settled the underlying debt upon which the lien was based.
Maxwell v. South Miami Hosp. Found., Inc., 385 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
145. Pavon, 266 So. 2d at 97.
146. 348 So. 2d. 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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vide for an equitable distribution of settlement monies between the
plaintiff's attorney and the hospital. 147
In examining the issue of the proceeds to which the lien may at-
tach, the Third District held in Fernandez v. South Carolina Insur-
ance Co. 14 that the lien attached to the patient's personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits even though such benefits could also be ap-
plied to funeral expenses, lost wages and earning capacity, as well as
for medical care.149
B. Special Acts
Only the Second District Court of Appeal, in Hospital Board of
Directors v. McCray,50 has explored the constitutionality of special
acts granting hospital liens. In 1978, the Legislature granted Lee Me-
morial Hospital, Lee County, the right to impose a hospital lien.", l
This special act virtually mirrored the 1951 Hospital Lien Act except
that it applied only to Lee Memorial Hospital rather than to any hos-
pital within a county or district. 5 2 Jackie McCray and her son, for-
mer hospital patients of Lee Memorial, contended that the special act
violated article III, section 11, subsection (a), paragraph (9) of the
Florida Constitution, which forbids special acts pertaining to the
"creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on
private contracts.""'  The trial court agreed and dismissed the hospi-
tal's claim with prejudice.'14
The Second District reversed, however, holding that because chap-
ter 78-552 creates a lien by statute rather than by private contract, it
does not violate the Florida's Constitution.'" The court supported its
holding by citing to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
147. Id. at 378; see also Crowder v. Dade County, 415 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
148. 408 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
149. Id. at 754. The applicability of hospital lien laws to personal injury protection (PIP)
insurance coverage is problematic. On one hand, it is often the only source of coverage for the
patient's injuries and is, therefore, of considerable significance to the hospital. On the other
hand, the coverage belongs to the patient and is not subject to a cause of action or a resulting
settlement or judgment. Whether or not attorneys' fees should be applicable to PIP coverage is
also arguable. Because the coverage benefits are directly accessible by the medical provider,
attorney intervention is often not necessary. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
150. 456 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
151. Ch. 78-552, 1978 Fla. Laws 185.
152. Id. § 1, 1987 Fla. Laws 186. A subsequent act, ch. 89-540, 1989 Fla. Laws 414,
granted a hospital lien to all nonprofit hospitals in the county.
153. FI.A. CoNsr. art. III,§ 1l(a)(9).
154. McCray, 456 So. 2d at 938.
155. Id. at 939.
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Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. for the proposition that similar
hospital liens have withstood constitutional attack." 6
As the McCrays ably pointed out in their Motion for Rehearing, if
a special act is exempted from the constitutional provision simply be-
cause it is statutory, then a special act could never be unconstitutional
under article III, section 11, subsection (a), paragraph (9), because all
special acts are statutory. 1 7 In addition, as explained above," 8 State
Farm was concerned with the constitutionality of the 1951 Act as a
general act of local application and did not consider the Act's rele-
vance to article III, section 11, subsection (a), paragraph (9).
While hospital liens may not violate the prohibition against liens
contained in the Florida Constitution, it is not for the reasons stated
in the McCray opinion. Exactly what this constitutional provision
was intended to proscribe and whether it applies to special acts creat-
ing hospital liens remain difficult questions.
The only other decision involving a county other than Dade
County is Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Estate of
Heron. 59 In Heron, the Fifth District held that Orange County's hos-
pital lien ordinance did not apply to proceeds resulting from a wrong-
ful death action.W0 The court reasoned that a wrongful death action
derives from the survivor's loss and not from the injured party's
claims. 161
IV. THE STATE CONSTITUTION
Article III, section 11, subsection (a), paragraph (9)162 of the 1968
Florida Constitution is a new provision.163 The 1885 Constitution did
156. Id.
157. Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 1, Hospital Bd. of Directors v. McCray, 456 So.
2d 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)(No. 83-2375) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
158. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
159. 596 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992). The opinion
in Heron infers that Orange County's hospital lien ordinance derives from the 1971 repeal of
the 1951 Hospital Lien Act. The 1971 repeal authorized qualifying counties to incorporate the
1951 Act by ordinance. The court seemed to be unaware that Orange County's ordinance is
based on the county's special act enacted in 1957, ch. 57-1644, 1957 Fla. Laws 2689. See OR-
Athos CouNTY, FLA., CODE art. IV (1992).
160. 596 So. 2d at 1079.
161. Id.
162. Section 11. Prohibited special laws.-
(a) There shall be no special law or general law of local application pertaining to:
(9) creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on private con-
tracts, or fixing of interest rates on private contracts.
163. ROBERT A. GRAY, REVISED FLORIDA CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND
ExPI.NATION OF CHANGES 5, 18 (discussing the 1957 proposed revision of the Florida Constitu-
tion).
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not contain a similar provision.' The first draft 65 of the section on
special laws that was prepared for the 1966 Constitution Revision
Commission was lifted verbatim from the 1957 constitutional initia-
tive. 166 That language simply states, "there shall not pass any special
or local laws pertaining to .. . creation, enforcement, extension, or
impairment of liens, or fixing of interest rates on private con-
tracts." 1 6 7 The phrase "based on private contracts," which is part of
the present Florida Constitution, was not included in either the 1957
or early 1966 drafts. 16 This phrase proves most problematic because
it qualifies the type of lien that may be created by special act. Unfor-
tunately, the phrase was added prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion held in November of 1966 and not by convention amendment. 69
No written record explaining the inclusion of this phrase seems to
exist.170
There are several ways of looking at the constitutional provision
prohibiting the creation of special acts based on private contract. As-
suming arguendo that all contracts are private, it is possible that the
164. Cf. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 20 (1967).
165. See STAFF OF FLA. LEGISLATrvE ComMITTEE OF THE 1966 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION RE vI-
SION COMPASSION, FIRST DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1966) (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, ser. 720, carton 6, folder 2, Tallahassee, Fla.).
166. A concurrent resolution of the 1955 Legislature created the Florida Constitution Advi-
sory Commission, which was instructed to propose recommendations for the revision of the
state constitution. Fla. HCR 92 (1955). The draft was submitted in 1957. Nevertheless, because
of a procedural complication, it was not presented in a manner that easily permitted ratifica-
tion and the draft was abandoned. CoNsTrruTIoN ComamITTE, THE FLORIDA BAR, PROPOSED
CONSTITUTION FOR FLORIDA 3-6 (1960).
An earlier 1947 proposal contains a section on prohibited special and private laws which is
quite similar to the 1957 proposal. DANIEL H. REDFEARN, A PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR
FLORIDA 27-28 (1947). Both simply prohibit special laws relating to liens.
167. Id.
168. The liens section of the draft dated June 14, 1966, retained most of the language of the
first draft. It was prepared for use at public hearings on the Constitution held during the sum-
mer of 1966 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 720, carton 2, folder 6,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
169. See DRAFrNo & STYIE Comm., FLA. CONST. REvISiON COMs'N, Proposed art. III § 11
(revised draft dated Nov. 10, 1966)(prepared for the Constitutional Convention)(available at
Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 720, carton 2, folder 8, Tallahassee, Fla.). No
amendments were offered to the subsection on liens during the convention. See Fla. Const.
Revision Comm'n, edited transcript of debate on art. III, pt. 2 at 236 (1966, vol. 18) (available
at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). One may presume that this was a
non-controversial issue.
170. The author conducted an extensive search of the files relating to article III of the Flor-
ida Constitution, from the 1957 Florida Constitution Advisory Commission, the 1966 Florida
Constitution Revision Commission, and the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission found at
the Florida State Archives and the Florida Supreme Court Library. Tapes from the public hear-
ings held around the state are also available at the Florida Archives. The author did not listen
to those tapes. Perhaps some explanation can be found therein.
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provision was simply intended to exclude liens based on contract. In
evaluating this possibility, one must distinguish between liens "based
on contract" and liens "created by contract." All liens are based on
some type of contractual relationship even if the contract is equitably
implied by a court to avoid unjust enrichment. 71 That the lien is cre-
ated by statute and not expressly contained in the contract is irrele-
vant." Statutorily created liens do not require an express statement
of the lien to be a condition of the contract, it is sufficient that the
lienor contracted to perform a statutorily defined service. 73 The lien
arises from the performance of that service, not as a condition of the
contract. Excluding all liens based on contract would exclude all liens
except those created by contract. If a contract, however, expressly
creates a lien, the need for a statutory lien disappears. The law recog-
nizes contractually created liens and will enforce them.
Therefore, the key must be that the lien must be characterized as a
"private" contract rather than a "public" one. In McCray, 74 the ap-
pellant, Lee County Hospital, argued this point, asserting that "since
Lee Memorial Hospital is a public agency, its contracts must be char-
acterized as 'public contracts." 17 Therefore, all hospital liens ema-
nating from public hospitals would avoid any constitutional
prohibition. 7 6 The appellant, however, cited no authority to support
this interpretation of the term "public contract." 77 However, just be-
cause the hospital is a public agency, its contract with a private citi-
zen is not necessarily a public contract."'
Instead, as appellees argued, what distinguishes a public contract
from a private one is whether the contract involves a public service or
project. Such contracts are extensively regulated and publicly scruti-
nized. 79 The vast body of literature on "public contracts" tends to
support this interpretation. 80 If this latter definition is correct, then
171. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173. See FLA. STAT, ch. 713 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
174. Note that this argument was not discussed in the opinion and was not the basis of the
court's holding.
175. Initial Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Hospital Bd. of Directors v. McCray, 456 So. 2d 936
(Fla. 2d DCA 1984)(No. 83-2375) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla).
176. Note that most of the special acts granting hospital liens apply to both public and
private hospitals.
177. None can be found in the Appellant's Brief. See supra note 174 and accompanying
text.
178. Id.
179. Answer Brief of Appellee at 7-9, McCray (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla).
180. For example, WEST DIOST contains a title on "Public Contracts" addressing precisely
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contracts that form the basis for hospital liens are private. A contract
between a hospital and a patient to provide medical care involves nei-
ther the building of a public project nor the providing of a public
service. If that is true, all hospital liens created by special act violate
the Florida Constitution because they are not based on public con-
tracts as that term is customarily understood.
A third, and more compelling, interpretation requires a broader
view of the constitutional provision. This explanation focuses on the
"public purpose" served by the entity that holds the lien rather than
the relationship between the contracting parties. That a hospital is
statutorily required to provide emergency medical care to the pub-
lic,' or to provide indigent care, 1 2 would be an expression of this
purpose and could be viewed as a public contract between the state
and the hospital. In this case, the obligatory relationship exists be-
tween the state and the entity, not between the lienholder and. the
person upon whom the lien is imposed. In other words, liens held by
public bodies that provide public services would be permissible. Ac-
cordingly, liens to reimburse hospitals that are obligated to provide
medical care to all citizens, regardless of their ability to pay, would
meet this limitation. Liens created by special act, however, and which
serve only a private purpose would be prohibited.
Two sources of historical evidence provide support for this per-
spective. First, in 1960, the Florida Bar sponsored a proposed revi-
sion to the constitution that prohibited special or local laws
pertaining to the "[c]reation, enforcement, extension, or impairment
of liens, except liens levied or imposed by municipalities, or fixing of
interest rates on private contracts." 18  Because municipalities are
formed to serve the public, this proposal suggests that there should be
some distinction between liens created to serve public bodies and
those imposed for the benefit of private interests.
An amendment, proposed during the 1966 Constitutional Conven-
tion, to a different portion of section 11 also supports this perspec-
tive.'18 During the discussion 5 of this amendment, the constitutional
these sorts of arrangements, 27 WEST'S FLA. DIGEST 2D Public Contracts (1985); see also 43
FLA. JuR. 2D Public Works & Contracts (1983). Both the First and Second RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS provide notations only to "public contracts" with a meaning identical to the one
proposed here. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 562 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF
CONTRACTS § 313 (1981). Neither Restatement contains a reference to "private contracts." The
implication is that everything that is not a public contract is a private contract.
181. FLA. STAT. § 154.31 (1991); FLA. STAT. §§ 395.1041, .403(7)(c) (Supp. 1992).
182. Special acts creating county hospital districts, or county or municipal hospitals gener-
ally contain clauses requiring the hospital or district to provide charity care.
183. CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, THE FLORIDA BAR, PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR FLORIDA
33 (1960) (emphasis added).
184. "The legislature shall not pass any special or local law pertaining to: transfer of any
19931 HOSPITAL LIEN LA WS
commission clearly communicated its desire not to hamper public
bodies, such as hospitals, in exercising liens. 86 While these two
sources of evidence are suggestive, interpretation of the text of the
constitutional provision proves difficult to support unless one as-
sumes that the principal contract is the one between the public entity
and the state rather than the one between the lienholder and the per-
son to whom the lien applies.
One other view of this problem focuses on the policy behind consti-
tutionally prohibiting certain categories of special acts. 8 7 To under-
property interest of persons under legal disabilities or of estates of decedents." See Revised
Draft dated Nov. 10, 1966 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 720, carton
2, folder 8, Tallahassee, Fla.).
185. The following discussion of this amendment took place at the convention:
MR. EARLE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, subparagraph (r) of
this section we are working on reads as follows:
"Transfer of any property interest to persons under legal disabilities or of estates
or decedents"
Mr. Pettigrew desires to add the following language:
"Except in enforcement of public liens"
It is his view that this section, as worded here, may preclude local bills enabling
public bodies, such as hospitals and others, from exercising liens on the people - on
property of the people described in this section.
In light of what has been happening here the last two motions, I don't intend to
argue this one extensively either.
I move its adoption.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Extensively is a rather limited word as you use it.
MR. EARLE: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Will the gentleman yield?
MR. EARLE: Yes, sir, I yield.
MR. BARKDULL: Will the gentleman yield?
MR. EARLE: Yes, sir.
MR. BARKDULL: Mr. Earle, is the purpose of this to protect, for instance, a
welfare hospital lien?
MR. EARLE: That is my understanding, sir.
MR. BARKDULL: Thank you.
MR. EARLE: And I don't believe it is necessary.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Gentlemen, we debated the issue already; didn't we?
MR. YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, I was going to point out we already had and the
committee opposed this in keeping with the philosophy that has been established here
several times this morning.
Fla. Const. Revision Comm'n, edited transcript of debate on art. III, pt. 2 at 236 (1966, vol.
18) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
186. Recall that at the time of the Constitution Commission there were eleven counties that
had special acts granting hospital liens, plus Dade and Duval that had hospital liens by virtue
of the 1951 Act. See supra notes 24-25, 36-44, 53-63 and accompanying text.
187. There is a fifth, somewhat cynical interpretation of why the phrase "based on private
contract" was included. It is possible that it was simply for clarification. Note that the second
part of subsection (9) prohibits the "fixing of interest rates on private contracts." Perhaps
some draftsman assumed that the term "private contract" must apply to both the first part of
the sentence relating to liens, and the second part relating to interest rates, and simply wanted
to clarify that by repeating the term in the lien section.
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stand this view, one must understand that a lien is a charge on
property. But because it is often not collectible until the sale of the
property, or, as in the case of hospital liens, until a settlement or
judgment is reached, it is hidden or dormant. Whereas those liens
expressly stated in a contract or which exist by virtue of general law
do not present this element of unpleasant surprise, liens created by a
special act, which are not stated in any contract and which do not
operate uniformly throughout the state, augment the hidden aspect of
liens. From this perspective, the original drafters acted wisely when
they included a provision prohibiting the creation of all liens by spe-
cial act in the Florida Constitution. Qualifying that prohibition by
preventing only those liens "based on private contract" would be rea-
sonable because one would want to prevent the statutory creation of
liens which depend on private contracts, as such contracts often in-
volve legally unsophisticated individuals who would be unaware of
the existence of liens crafted by special acts and their legal obliga-
tions. There need be no prohibition of liens based on public con-
tracts, however, because they are by nature the subject of public
review and scrutiny. Persons or entities seeking to obtain these con-
tracts often have experience in the process of reviewing the statutory
obligations that regulate these arrangements.
Because hospital liens created by special act involve individuals in
private contractual arrangements, they would be vulnerable to the
concerns raised above. All of the special acts granting hospital liens
make persons participating in settlements prior to satisfaction of the
hospital liens liable for payment to the hospital, regardless of settle-
ment. Therefore, such persons must be aware of the special act and
bear the burden of searching the public records before settling any
suit or paying any insurance proceeds. As this liability does not arise
by virtue of a general act, an unsuspecting claimant from outside the
county or hospital district or an out-of-state insurance carrier might
ignore the special act and suffer the consequences.
Most importantly, because the hospital lien preempts attorneys'
fees, an injured plaintiff may not be able to find counsel to represent
him or her in seeking reimbursement for medical costs. It is unthinka-
ble that access to the courts could be dependent on the county in
which a potential plaintiff is hospitalized or even perhaps on the par-
ticular hospital to which he is admitted.
While few would argue with a public policy supporting the ability
of hospitals to find a logical source of reimbursement for unpaid
medical bills-in this case, from the tortfeasors accident or liability
insurance coverage-such a policy should operate uniformly through-
out the state and not by special act. Indeed, article III, section 11, is
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intended to prohibit the legislature from doing by special act what it
should do by general law. 8' A review of article III, section 11, dem-
onstrates that general law regulates those things which the section
prohibits.' 8 9
The factors discussed above cast doubt on the continued constitu-
tionality of hospital liens created by special act. Given the plain
meaning of the Florida Constitution, not only are such acts doubtful,
they challenge policy considerations implicit in the prohibition of cer-
tain types of special acts. Even if these hospital lien acts prove to be
188. See Carlton v. Johnson, 55 So. 975 (Fla. 1911).
The effect of the organic provision requiring that laws upon stated subjects shall not
be local or special, but shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the
state, is to forbid the enactment of a law on the stated subjects that is arbitrarily
made applicable to one or to several of the territorial subdivisions of the state, where
a general law on the same subject could properly be made applicable to the entire
state or to all that portion of the state similarly situated or conditioned with refer-
ence to the subject regulated.
Id. at 976; see also Manatee County v. Davidson, 181 So. 889, 891 (Fla. 1938).
189. Section 11. Prohibited special laws.-
(a) There shall be no special law or general law of local application pertaining to:
(1) election, jurisdiction or duties of officers, except officers of municipalities, char-
tered counties, special districts or local governmental agencies;
(2) assessment or collection of taxes for state or county purposes, including extension
of time therefor, relief of tax officers from due performance of their duties, and
relief of their sureties from liability;
(3) rules of evidence in any court;
(4) punishment for crime;
(5) petit juries, including compensation of jurors, except establishment of jury com-
missions;
(6) change of civil or criminal vnue;
(7) conditions precedent to bringing any civil or criminal proceedings, or limitations
of time therefor;
(8) refund of money legally paid or remissions of fines, penalties or forfeitures;
(9) creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on private con-
tracts, or fixing of interest rates on private contracts;
(10) disposal of public property, including any interest therein, for private purposes;
(11) vacation of roads;
(12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private corporation;
(13) effectuation of invalid deeds, wills or other instruments, or change in law of
descent;
(14) change of name of any person;
(15) divorce;
(16) legitimation or adoption of persons;
(17) relief of minors from legal disabilities;
(18) transfer of any property interest of persons under legal disabilities or of estates
of decedents;
(19) hunting or fresh water fishing;
(20) regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state agency; or
(21) any subject when prohibited by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the
membership of each house. Such law may be amended or repealed by like vote.
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a).
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constitutional, the concepts of fairness and providing full access to




Given the present fragmented system of seeking reimbursement for
unpaid health care, one can reasonably support a procedure that
grants hospital liens on sums recovered in liability claims. A survey of
other states' lien laws shows that hospital liens are an established,
widespread method for easing the burden of indigent health care.
Nevertheless, if the Florida Legislature continues to sanction this
method of obtaining payment for medical care, it should do so in a
uniform manner. It appears that the only obstacle blocking attain-
ment of uniformity remains disagreement over provisions for attor-
neys' fees.
A hospital lien should make some allowance for attorneys' fees and
patient losses. The present situation, which depends on the largess of
the hospital, can discourage worthy claimants from seeking any sort
of recovery whenever there is an insufficiency of funds to cover litiga-
tion expenses and claimant disability compensation. This permits lia-
ble tortfeasors to avoid payment. As a result, both hospitals and
plaintiffs suffer.
It is not surprising that hospitals in counties with lien laws that
make no allowances for plaintiff attorneys' fees'0 are not interested
in disturbing the current arrangement because they enjoy a superior
bargaining position. Hospitals argue that they should continue to en-
joy this advantage because under Florida law'91 they have no choice
but to provide emergency care, unlike attorneys who may select their
clients.
In counties with these types of lien laws, both the attorney and the
hospital are forced to scale back their expectations and participate in
some sort of pro-rata distribution of any proceeds when the potential
recovery is insufficient to cover all costs, in order for all to receive at
least some portion of the recovery. A lien law that places attorneys
first would eliminate the bargaining power of hospitals. Attorneys
190. Under the contingent fee arrangement, the attorney is limited to a certain percent of
the proceeds depending upon the progress of the action and the size of the recovery. See FLA.
BARn. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5 (1993).
191. See supra note 181.
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would simply have switched places with hospitals, except that the at-
torneys would have no need to bargain with the hospitals.
A review of hospital lien laws among the several states reveals sev-
eral options. The most obvious alternative requires some sort of pro-
rata distribution between the hospital, the plaintiff, and the plain-
tiff's attorney when there are insufficient funds to meet all expenses.
A second solution would be to retain the present arrangement,
which gives priority to the hospital lien, but permit the court to ap-
portion the recovery if necessary. 92 Similarly, primacy could be given
to court costs and attorneys' fees with the court having discretion to
alter the distribution of the proceeds. 93 Florida's Workers' Compen-
sation Law prescribes a fee schedule but also includes factors which
allow the judge of compensation claims to alter the attorneys' fees. 94
Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act suggests a third solu-
tion. Section 409.910(ll)(f), Florida Statutes, provides that in the
event the amount of a judgment, award, or settlement is equal to or
less than 200% of the amount of medical assistance provided by
Medicaid, the recipient's attorney shall receive twenty-five percent of
that recovery, less costs and expenses of litigation. 95 The section fur-
ther provides that Medicaid receive two-thirds of the amount remain-
ing after attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and the recipient receive
the remainder. '6 This solution has appeal because it requires the at-
torney to reduce his or her customary contingency proportion, but
guarantees a twenty-five percent share of whatever is recovered. In
addition, the plaintiff is assured some portion of the award.
B. Insurance
A final issue that must be addressed considers whether hospitals
should continue to seek recovery for medical costs against accident or
liability coverage even when the patient has adequate health insur-
ance. This was not the original intent of the hospital lien statute. As
previously stated, hospital liens were instituted as a means of obtain-
192. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text, discussing Dade County v. Bodie and
Dade County v. Perez, where the court tried to reduce the hospital's lien; see also Arizona's
hospital lien law, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-934 (1990 & Supp. 1992), which does not provide
for attorneys' fees and court cost but permits the court to allow for reasonable attorneys' fees
and disbursements if the claimant prevails.
193. See ALA. CODE § 35-11-373 (1991 & Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.9 (Michie
1992).
See also FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (Supp. 1992) (directing the court to determine and award a
reasonable fee for the prevailing party's attorney's services).
194. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1991).
195. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(l1)(f) (1991).
196. Id.
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ing reimbursement for medical care provided to insolvent patients.' 97
Under Florida's Collateral Source Rule, 98 a collateral source of bene-
fits, such as a health insurance carrier, has a right of subrogation,
that is, a right to be reimbursed by a claimant if the claimant recovers
from a tortfeasor. Unlike hospitals under most hospital lien laws,
however, the health insurer must share in the costs of any attorneys'
fees incurred by the claimant. '" Further, any amounts recovered are
also subject to court determination depending on such other mitigat-
ing factors as the court deems equitable and appropriate under the
circumstances. 200 Not surprisingly, under such circumstances, a health
insurer of an accident victim in a county with a hospital lien law
would hold back knowing that the tortfeasor's insurance is subject to
the hospital's lien and, therefore, has first responsibility to pay. As
previously mentioned, the hospital would also prefer to seek payment
from the tortfeasor's liability insurance as it pays at a higher rate
than health insurance. 20' Unfortunately, by seeking payment first
against automobile and liability insurance, a source of payment for
expenses such as lost wages and litigation costs can be quickly ex-
hausted by medical expenses alone. Conversely, seeking reimburse-
ment from health insurance first, which pays only for medical costs,
increases the potential pot for non-medical expenses, including disa-
bility reimbursement and attorneys' fees. 20 2 The issue then becomes
whether a general hospital lien statute should be limited to only those
instances in which the injured patient has no other source of health
care coverage. 203
The answer to this complicated question depends, to some extent,
on success in instituting methods of reducing redundancy in our pres-
ent system of health care, the subrogation relationship between the
different forms of insurance, and the need of the patient to maximize
his or her ability to draw upon a variety of sources for excessive med-
ical bills.
197. See supra note 19 and accompanying text,
198. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (1991). This section was amended during the 1993 legislative ses-
sion. See Ch. 93-245, 1993 Fla. Laws 2436.
199. Ch. 93-245, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2437 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76(4) (1991)).
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
202. See ID. CODE § 32-8-26-3 (1980 & Supp. 1992) (requiring the lien to be first reduced
by the amount of any medical insurance proceeds paid to the hospital on behalf of the patient
after the hospital has made all reasonable efforts to pursue the insurance claims in cooperation
with the patient).
203. As previously noted, neither Medicare or Medicaid coverage would ever pay before
liability coverage since both are always the payors of last resort. See supra note 21.
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V. CON¢CLUSION
The purpose of this article was to explore the historical, statutory,
and constitutional issues relating to hospital liens in order to clarify
and narrow the present controversy between attorneys and hospitals.
It seems that it is to everyone's advantage to have a uniform state-
wide law. Although those hospitals that presently enjoy a lien law
which makes no allowances for attorneys' fees would be surrendering
their superior bargaining position, nothing would be lost provided
that the attorneys were made to share in any reimbursement reduc-
tions. After all, hospitals claim that they already engage in informal
pro-rata arrangements with plaintiffs' attorneys in order to ensure at
least some recovery. Therefore, a statute that formalizes this arrange-
ment would seem to offer no disadvantage. In addition, a statutory
mandate requiring some sort of pro-rata distribution of limited pro-
ceeds would eliminate the discouragement that plaintiffs experience in
counties in which hospitals refuse to allocate any portion of the pro-
ceeds to the plaintiffs or their attorneys.
A statewide law would also provide additional advantages. First, a
statewide law should cut down on settlement arrangements between
injured persons and tortfeasors and their insurance carriers which ex-
clude hospitals. Because hospital liens exist by virtue of special acts
or local ordinances, they are often invisible to out-of-state insurance
companies, attorneys whose chief area of practice is in counties that
do not have hospital lien laws, and to plaintiffs who are simply una-
ware that hospital lien laws exist. Since hospital lien laws are not cod-
ified, anyone familiar with hospital lien laws in other states who
searched the Florida Statutes could easily come to the conclusion that
Florida has no lien law. A visible statewide lien law would go a long
way toward eliminating this problem.
Second, a statewide law would make hospital liens available to the
majority of Florida hospitals, both public and private, which do not
presently have the benefit of a lien law. Furthermore, a statewide law
should increase revenues available to hospitals in counties that have
lien laws that permit attorneys' fees to be paid first.
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